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Abstract
This thesis aims to assess the impact of downward wage rigidities on optimal tax-
ation. We study a dynamic general equilibrium neoclassical growth model for a one
sector, cashless stochastic closed economy with an innitely lived representative house-
hold, a representative rm with a constant returns to scale technology, a government
deciding how to nance its exogenous expenditures without access to lump sum taxes,
and competitive markets. We conclude that the optimal labor income tax exhibits both
a reactive and a precautionary nature. Regarding the reactive nature, when the wage
rigidity is binding, labor taxes increase since it is possible to raise revenue without ad-
ditional distortions. On the precautionary side, the expectation of a future constraint
lowers labor taxes, which, in turn, decreases the wage that clears the labor market, thus
loosening future constraints. In the nominal small open economy with downwardly rigid
nominal wages and exogenous nominal exchange rates, we show that the same conclu-
sions apply. Additionally, it is possible to use consumption taxes in such a way that the
optimal capital control tax is zero for a broad family of instantaneous utility functions.
Finally, we introduce a consumption tax that discriminates between the good produced
in the domestic economy and the good produced abroad to show that downward wage
rigidities and exogenous exchange rates are irrelevant if the correct policy is used.
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Resumo
Esta tese pretende avaliar o impacto de rigidezes salariais decrescentes sobre a política
scal óptima. Para tal, usamos um modelo dinâmico de equilibrío geral, concordante com
a corrente neoclásica, para uma economia estocástica fechada, sem moeda, de horizonte
temporal innito com uma família representativa, uma empresa representativa que usa
uma tecnologia com rendimentos constantes à escala num único sector, um governo que
precisa de nanciar a sequência exógena de gastos sem ter acesso a impostos lump sum,
e mercados competitivos. É possível concluir que o imposto óptimo sobre o rendimento
do trabalho apresenta características reactivas e precautórias. No que respeita à vertente
reactiva, quando a restrição salarial é activa, o imposto deve aumentar visto ser possível
recolher mais receita sem introduzir distorções adicionais. Na vertente precautória, a ex-
pectativa de uma restrição futura diminui o imposto, o que, por sua vez, reduz o salário
que equilibra o mercado do trabalho, relaxando, desta forma, as restrições futuras. Para
a pequena economia aberta nominal, com rigidez decrescente no salário nominal junta-
mente com taxas de câmbio nominais exógenas, o mesmo resultado é obtido. Além disso,
mostramos que é possível implementar impostos sobre o consumo tais que o imposto
óptimo de controlo de capitais seja zero para uma variedade de funções utilidade instan-
tâneas. Finalmente, introduzimos um imposto sobre o consumo que discrimina o bem
doméstico do bem produzido no exterior para demonstrar que rigidezes decrescentes no
salário nominal, juntamente com taxas de câmbio nominais exógenas, se tornam irrele-
vantes para uma correcta utilização desta política.
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1 Introduction
Mundells trillema of monetary policy states that an open economy cannot have an inde-
pendent monetary policy with xed exchange rates and free capital mobility. This idea is
perfectly illustrated by the covered interest rate parity condition, for it shows that the do-
mestic nominal interest rate is completely determined outside the economy provided there
is free capital mobility and xed exchange rates. Consequently, many countries with xed
exchange rate regimes (or in the particular case of a monetary union), have to bear the
costs "resulting from the loss in ability to use policy for stabilization purposes" (Adão,
Correia, and Teles 2009). Particularly, when facing nominal rigidities, such countries are
negated the possibility of attaining the same allocations as it would be possible under ex-
ible nominal exchange rates. For instance, if the economy needs to reduce the real wage in
order to boost competitiveness, as a response to a low aggregate productivity parameter,
for example, but nominal wages cannot be lowered, a nominal devaluation would solve this
problem. However, if there is a constraint on the exchange rate policy, the real wage will
not adjust completely and ine¢ ciencies arise. This is one of the reasons for which Milton
Friedman (1953) has argued in favor of exible exchange rate regimes under circumstances
of nominal rigidities.
The recent European crisis provides a good example of these costs. "Membership in
the eurozone has been blamed for the inability of countries like Greece, Ireland, Portugal,
and Spain to devalue their exchange rates and restore their competitiveness in international
markets" (Farhi, Gopinath and Itskhoki 2012). Even though these problems have been
extensively studied and solved, the fact remains that they are not isolated, i.e. they tend
to be recurrent throughout the course of history, ever since they rst appeared with the
gold standard. Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2016) report other examples, which include the
case of Argentina during the second half of the Convertibility Plan, specically for the
period of 1998 to 2001, when the Argentine central bank was pegging the Argentine peso
to the U.S. dollar. There, the negative e¤ects of the combination of downward nominal
wage rigidity and currency pegs was quite visible, for the period considered was a period
of rising unemployment. On the episode of the Great Recession of 2008, in which the main
protagonists are the European periphery countries on the euro area, data used by Schmitt-
-Grohé and Uribe (2016) suggests the same rise in unemployment accompanied by rising
nominal wages. And so, given these examples, it is important to shed new light on this
topic.
Problems such as the one presented above have led economists to study how to conduct
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scal and monetary policy in order to make xed exchange rate regimes irrelevant for the
equilibrium allocations, or to replicate the e¤ects of nominal devaluations. For this reason,
this eld came to be known as the eld of scal devaluations. For instance, Adão, Correia,
and Teles (2009) use a Ramsey optimal scal and monetary policy approach in a two
open economies model to show that there is a minimal set of instruments such that, under
the assumptions of no international labor mobility and no tradeability of state contingent
private debt, the equilibrium allocations in the exible producer price, exible nominal
exchange rate model can be implemented with stable producer prices and a xed exchange
rate. The implication of this result is that xed exchange rate regimes are irrelevant for
the allocations, no matter the type and degree of price rigidity that may exist, i.e. even
in the presence of some price rigidity such as staggered Calvo prices, xed exchange rate
regimes come with zero welfare costs. In Adão, Correia, and Teles (2010) the irrelevance
result is extended to encompass nominal wage rigidities. They show that the minimal
set of instruments needs just to be augmented to include payroll taxes, so that, in the
exible prices, exible nominal wages, and exible nominal exchange rate economies, the
equilibrium allocations can be implemented with scal and monetary policy that allows for
prices and nominal wages to be stable, even with a constant nominal exchange rate. The
use of payroll taxes, particularly decreasing payroll taxes in order to allow the e¤ective real
wage to decrease, presents, nevertheless, some problems. In fact, the nancing of these
lower payroll taxes is through an increase in labor income taxes, which might be perceived
as an income transfer from households to capitalists, and so, it may be hard to implement.
In short, these contributions suggest that, since prices and wages can be made stable in
the economy with exible prices and nominal wages, then restrictions on these variables,
whatever they may be, are completely irrelevant.
Farhi, Gopinath, and Itskhoki (2012) highlight that one of the problems concerning
Adão, Correia, and Teles (2009 and 2010) irrelevance results lies in the fact that the
minimal set of instruments includes both domestic and foreign taxes. Consequently, the
irrelevance results cannot be implemented unilaterally by one of the economies. With this
disadvantage in mind, the authors study a New Keynesian open economy and develop scal
policies, namely a combination of a value-added tax with payroll taxes and export subsidies
with import tari¤s, that robustly replicate the e¤ects of a devaluation of domestic currency,
i.e. that apply to a signicant variety of environments. Indeed, they show that both these
policies are applicable across di¤erent price setting assumptions and di¤erent congurations
of the assets market. There are, however, some additional instruments that should be used
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depending on the circumstances. For instance, when foreign debt is denominated in domestic
currency, replicating the e¤ects of a nominal devaluation requires using a tax on the return
of foreign investors so as to induce the same loss of wealth that would stem from a nominal
devaluation. Furthermore, Farhi, Gopinath, and Itskhokis (2012) proposed scal policies
can be implemented with zero net impact on the overall governments budget decit. In
their words, these policies are "revenue-neutral".
Nevertheless, none of these works studies how to conduct scal policy in economies
characterized by the failure of these results, i.e. in economies where nominal rigidities
combined with xed exchange rates indeed incur in welfare costs. That is the scope of this
work.
In a related line of work, Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2016) start from a rst best en-
vironment for a small open economy with a currency peg and introduce a distortion on
nominal wages - downward nominal wage rigidity - thus generating a negative externality
stemming from overborrowing in expansionary periods, which leads to a rise in the nominal
wage and consequent unemployment during recessions. From that point on, the authors
approach is to introduce another distortion, summarized in a capital control tax, which is
shown to be prudential in nature, i.e. the optimal capital control is high during economic
expansions to prevent the economy from overheating and nominal wages from inating, and
low during recessions to provide stimuli. As it turns out, the second best principle stating
that additional distortions can improve welfare is valid in their framework. Other references
on optimal capital controls include the work of Farhi and Werning (2012). They study the
optimality of capital controls in response to a variety of shocks and show that they are
highly e¤ective when employed as a response to risk-premium shocks.
This work strives to understand how the existence of downward nominal wage rigidities
in the open economy, combined with an exogenous stochastic sequence of nominal exchange
rates, impacts on optimal taxation policy when only labor income, capital income, and
consumption taxes are available. With this in mind, we are going to study a dynamic
general equilibrium neoclassical growth model for both a real stochastic closed economy and
a nominal stochastic small open economy with an innitely lived representative household
and competitive rms, where the single composite good produced domestically and abroad
is homogeneous. In contrast with Adão, Correia, and Teles (2009), whose environment is
characterized by imperfect competition, we propose a simple competitive environment where
all rms in the domestic economy are price takers. The main advantage of this assumption
is that we can simplify the economy by abstracting from price setting assumptions, thus
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allowing us to study only the implications of nominal wage rigidities in economies without
control over the nominal exchange rate. Money is not going to be used in transactions,
though it is going to serve as mean of value. Additionally, we assume, in contrast to
Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2016), that the environment is characterized by the absence of
lump sum taxes, thus implying the rst best solution is not attainable. Ergo, we follow the
standard approach in the literature on optimal scal and monetary policy after Lucas and
Stokey (1983), which takes a Ramsey central planner deciding how to raise distortionary
taxes to nance exogenous government expenditures.
In the closed economy framework, where real wages are assumed to be downwardly rigid
à la Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2016), we conclude that the optimal labor income tax is both
reactive and precautionary in nature. Its reactive nature, consisting on increasing the tax
rate in states of the current period in which the wage rigidity is binding, is explained by the
fact that the level of employment is demand determined, thus implying that the government
can raise revenue without introducing any additional distortions. For the precautionary
nature, it arises when there are expectations of a future wage constraint. In that case,
labor income taxes decrease in that state of the current period in order to lower the labor
market clearing wage, thus loosening future constraints. The optimal capital income tax is
shown to vary negatively with the expectation of a constraint for the following period, and
positively with the expectation of a constraint for two periods from the current one. In the
small open economy, we show that the optimal labor income tax exhibits the same reactive
and precautionary nature. Additionally, we show that there is a choice of consumption
taxes, irrelevant for the allocations, such that the optimal capital control tax is zero. In
a second best environment, such choice of consumption taxes also determines an optimal
zero capital income tax. Hence, we revisit Correias (1996) result stating that optimal
taxation in a small open economy, taxing income from abroad using the worldwide system,
and in a closed economy is quite similar in the sense that Chamleys (1986) and Judds
(1985) result of zero capital income taxation in steady state, which can be interpreted as
no intertemporal distortions, holds even in our framework of a stochastic economy, where
there is no steady state. Furthermore, we show that consumption taxes can be used to
discriminate between the good produced domestically and the good produced abroad, thus
allowing us to establish an irrelevance result in the same spirit as that of Adão, Correia,
and Teles (2009). Particularly, when used correctly, consumption taxes can replace the role
of the nominal exchange rate. thus implying that the combination of downwardly rigid
nominal wages and exogenous nominal exchange rates comes with zero welfare costs, i.e.
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consumption taxes allow for the implementation of the second best solution.
The outline of this work is as follows. First, we start by analyzing the e¤ects of downward
wage rigidities on optimal taxes in a one sector closed economy environment. The purpose
is to understand how the central planner incorporates the externality arising from the
assumption of downward real wage rigidity on the optimal taxes. Then, in section 3, we open
the economy to a foreign sector with which a homogenous good and non state contingent
net foreign debt can be traded, and impose downwardly nominal wages and an exogenous
stochastic sequence of nominal exchange rates, in order to see how the introduction of the
foreign debt dynamics impacts the Ramsey planners decision of optimal taxes. Section
4 follows with the establishment of our irrelevance result arising from a special use of
consumption tax policy. Section 5 concludes.
2 The stochastic representative agent closed economy with
downward real wage rigidity
This section presents a stochastic neoclassical growth model for a one sector closed economy.
The purpose is to understand how wage rigidities - real wage rigidities in particular as we
are going to consider a real economy where the composite good is the numeraire - impact
on optimal Ramsey taxation policy. In doing so, we intend to isolate the impact of this
friction on optimal taxation policy, which will be helpful in section 4 where the economy is
open, for the e¤ects arising from wage rigidities and foreign debt can be separated.
The closed economy has an innitely lived representative household with preferences
over consumption and labor, competitive rms with a constant returns to scale technology,
and a government that issues state contingent debt but is not allowed to use lump sum
taxes to nance its exogenous sequence of expenditures. In each period t  0 the economy
experiences one of nitely many events st, which are due to uncertainty on productivity
and government expenditures. The initial realization s0 is given. The set of all possible
events in period t is denoted by St, the history of these events up to and including period
t, dened as state at t, (s0; s1; :::; st) is represented by st, and the set of all possible states
in period t is denoted by St.
Furthermore, real wages are assumed to be downwardly rigid. In particular, we bor-
row and adapt Schmitt-Grohé and Uribes (2016) assumption on downward nominal wage
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rigidity to introduce real wage rigidity in this economy as
wt
 
st
  wt 1  st 1 ; (1)
where  2 ]0; 1] represents the degree of downward wage rigidity. Higher values of  are,
therefore, associated with a higher degree of rigidity, where  = 1 characterizes full wage
rigidity. On the other hand, lower values of  put the economy closer to the exible wage
economy. In the limit, wages are fully exible when  = 0:
This assumption can be thought to be associated with some structural problem of the
economy, i.e. some institutional imposition, legislation, or a status quo bias in wage bar-
gaining. With employment being determined by the short side of the labor market, this
assumption generates a negative externality, according to which involuntary unemployment
may exist in contractionary periods, for the adverse shock may lead to an equilibrium in
which the labor market clearing real wage is below the lower bound of period t, wt 1. The
reason is that agents are too small to internalize the fact that their decisions can collectively
a¤ect aggregate variables.
2.1 The representative household
The representative household has preferences over the consumption of the composite good,
ct, and labor, lt, described by the expected utility function
U =
1X
t=0
X
st
t Prt
 
st

u

ct
 
st

; lt
 
st

= E0
1X
t=0
tu

ct
 
st

; lt
 
st

, (2)
where 0 <  < 1 is the subjective discount factor. The instantaneous utility function
u

ct
 
st

; lt
 
st

satises the usual properties that guarantee the existence of an interior
solution, i.e. the instantaneous utility function is continuous and twice di¤erentiable, it is
increasing in consumption, decreasing in labor, and globally concave, and Inada conditions
lim
c!0
uc = 1, lim
c!1uc = 0, liml!0
ul = 0, and lim
l!l
ul =  1 hold, where l stands for a maximal
feasible level of labor.
In each state st of period t  0; the representative household receives income from
labor lt
 
st

, which is taxed at the proportional rate  lt
 
st

, from the predetermined level
of capital kt
 
st 1

, taxed at the proportional rate kt
 
st 1

, and from state contingent real
government bonds bt
 
st

. Prots are not considered, though rms are owned by households,
due to the fact that the assumptions of competitive markets and a constant returns to scale
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
to the exible wage situation. Hence, at such a solution, the marginal disutility of labor,
ul;t
 
st

, which is decreasing, is excessively small, in absolute value, while the decreasing
marginal utility of consumption, uc;t
 
st

, is excessively high. The remaining conditions can
be interpreted as no arbitrage conditions. Conditions (7), which state that the intertemporal
marginal rate of substitution is equal to the relative price of current consumption, relate to
the alternative ways a unit of consumption can be used. It can either be used to consume
in the current period or it can be invested in capital, generating a state contingent return
and allowing for consumption in the future period, whose valuation depends on the current
expectations of the future state of nature. Essentially, both alternatives must yield the
same marginal benet, i.e. the optimal allocation of consumption over time must leave the
representative household indi¤erent between these alternatives. Conditions (8) represent
the equality between the marginal rate on substitution between a state of period t and a
given state of period t + 1 and the relative price of current consumption in those states of
di¤erent periods.
2.2 The representative rm
Firms in this economy are competitive, i.e. price takers. The production technology uses
labor and capital according to the production function
Yt
 
st
  A  stF  kt  st 1 ; lt  st ;
where A
 
st

represents the aggregate stochastic productivity parameter. This production
function is assumed to verify the standard properties, i.e. it is continuous and twice dif-
ferentiable, it exhibits constant returns to scale, the marginal productivities of inputs are
positive and decreasing (Fk; Fl > 0 and Fkk; Fll < 0), and it veries the Inada conditions
lim
k!0
Fk (k; l) = lim
l!0
Fl (k; l) = 1 and lim
k!1
Fk (k; l) = lim
l!1
Fl (k; l) = 0. Additionally, both
inputs are assumed to be essential in the sense that F (0; l) = F (k; 0) = 0.
Taking prices as given, the representative rm is going to choose in each state st of
period t  0 the inputs lt and kt in order to maximize prots. These are written as
t
 
st

= A
 
st

F
 
kt
 
st 1

; lt
 
st
  wt  st lt  st  rkt  st kt  st :
Prot maximizing behavior implies choosing the level of inputs such that their marginal
productivities are equal to their real remuneration. This means that the optimal conditions
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
reasons discussed above. On the other hand, if real wages were to face no problem adjusting,
i.e. condition (1) does not bind, there would be no reason for involuntary unemployment to
exist and condition (6) would be veried with equality. To incorporate these features, one
needs to introduce the following complementary slackness conditions: 
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For the remaining markets (goods, capital, and government bonds), only the goods
market clearing conditions should be considered, given that the same variable was used
to dene demand and supply in the capital and government bonds markets. That being
said, the goods market clearing conditions, also called resource constraints, for each state
of nature st in each period t  0 are presented as
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  (1  ) kt  st 1 = A  stF  kt  st 1 ; lt  st : (13)
2.5 Competitive equilibrium
Denition 1 In this stochastic closed economy, a competitive equilibrium is a set of al-
locations
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for all st 2 St, such that given the ex-
ogenous stochastic government expenditures g
 
st

and aggregate productivity A
 
st

, the
initial stock of capital k0, the initial stock of government bonds b0, and the historical real
wage w 1, the following conditions are met: (i) the representative household maximizes life-
time expected utility subject to the budget constraints, taking prices and taxes as given; (ii)
the representative rm chooses kt and lt in each state in order to maximize prots subject
to the technology constraints, taking prices as given; (iii) the government satises its budget
constraints; and (iv) markets clear.
It follows from Denition (1) that the conditions that characterize the competitive equi-
librium in this stochastic closed economy are (3), (6)-(10), (12), and (13), together with the
terminal conditions (4) and (5), with k0, and b0 given.
The fact that there is no need to have the government budget constraints (11) to char-
acterize the competitive equilibrium is worth mentioning. Indeed, the irrelevance of these
conditions is associated with Walras law, i.e. the idea that if all the other equilibrium
conditions are met, so must be conditions (11), for they are a linear combination of the
others.
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










 


marginal conditions (7) and (8) are satised choosing, respectively, the capital income tax
kt+1
 
st 1

and the price of state contingent real government bonds qt
 
st+1

for every Euler
equation. The capital rent rkt
 
st

and the real wage wt
 
st

in every state can be used to
recover the rms conditions (9) and (10). And the complementary slackness conditions (12)
are met since the allocation complies with the implementability condition (14) veried with
equality. This idea comes from the fact that even in states in which the wage constraint
is binding, the central planner is always going to conduct policy such that condition (6) is
veried with equality, which, in turn, implies that the implementability condition (14) is
holds with equality. Finally, the resource constraints (13), which are one of the su¢ cient
conditions, are, by denition of the allocation considered, satised.
The proof of Lemma (1) highlights the fact that the competitive equilibrium can be
implemented for any choice of the consumption tax,  ct
 
st

, for this instrument was not
used to satisfy any of the competitive equilibrium conditions, i.e. any arbitrary choice for
the sequence of state contingent consumption taxes, either a constant pattern or a varying
one, has no implications for the equilibrium allocations. The only adjustments would occur
in the appropriate choices of  lt
 
st

, kt+1
 
st 1

, and qt
 
st+1

.
2.6.2 Optimal taxes
The purpose of this part is to determine the sequence of taxes

 ct
 
st

;  lt
 
st

; kt+1
 
st
	1
t=0
,
8 st 2 St a benevolent central planner should choose in this economy with wage rigidities.
Although it was pointed out that consumption taxes are irrelevant in this economy, we are
going to abstract from the solution

 ct
 
st
	1
t=0
= 0, 8 st 2 St, for in doing so, it will
be possible to cancel out some intertemporal distortions for a more general instantaneous
utility function.
In consideration of the foregoing, we follow Lucas and Stokey (1983) and dene the
benevolent social planners problem, who follows a Ramsey approach, as the choice of
the allocations

ct
 
st

; lt
 
st

; kt+1
 
st
	1
t=0
, 8 st 2 St that maximizes lifetime expected
utility (2) subject to the resource constraints (13), the implementability condition (14)
with equality, and the wage rigidity constraints (15), with k0, b0, and w 1 given. The
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Lagrangean function of this problem is
L = E0
1X
t=0
t

u

ct
 
st

; lt
 
st

+ '
 
uc;t
 
st

ct
 
st

+ ul;t
 
st

lt
 
st
 
 E0
1X
t=0
t

t
 
st
  
ct
 
st

+ g
 
st

+ kt+1
 
st
  (1  ) kt  st 1 A  stF  kt  st 1 ; lt  st+
+E0
1X
t=1
tt
 
st
  
A
 
st

Fl;t
 
st
  A  st 1Fl;t 1  st 1+ 0 (A0Fl;0   w 1)  'V0:
The rst order condition with respect to ct
 
st

is
t

uc;t
 
st

+ '
 
ucc;t
 
st

ct
 
st

+ uc;t
 
st

+ ulc;t
 
st

lt
 
st
  t  st = 0; t  0, 8 st:
The rst order condition with respect to lt
 
st

is
t

ul;t
 
st

+ '
 
ucl;t
 
st

ct
 
st

+ ull;t
 
st

lt
 
st

+ ul;t
 
st

+ t
 
st

A
 
st

Fl;t
 
st

+
+tt
 
st

A
 
st

Fll;t
 
st
  Et t+1t+1  st+1 A  stFll;t  st = 0; t  0, 8 st:
The rst order condition with respect to kt+1
 
st

is
 tt + t+1Et

t+1
 
1   +A  st+1Fk;t+1+ t+1A  st+1Flk;t+1 
 Et+1

t+2t+2A
 
st+1

Flk;t+1

= 0; t  0, 8 st;
where the variables are a function of the state.
In states of nature where restriction (15) does not bind, it must be that t
 
st

= 0. On
the other hand, once the restriction binds, then t
 
st

> 0. All in all, the solution to the
central planners problem is also characterized by the complementary slackness conditions
0 (A0Fl;0   w 1) = 0 (16)
t
 
st
  
A
 
st

Fl;t
 
st
  A  st 1Fl;t 1  st 1 = 0; t  1;8 st:
The conditions which, together with the resource constraints (13), the implementability
constraint (14) with equality, the complementary slackness conditions (16), and initial values
of capital and government bonds, k0 and b0, and w 1, characterize the solution to the social
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planners problem are
 ul;t
uc;t

1 + '
 
1 + lt + 
lc
t

1 + '
 
1  ct + clt
 = A  stFl;t+ (17)
+
A
 
st

Fll;t
uc;t

1 + 
 
1  ct + clt
 t   Ett+1 ; t  0, 8 st;
and
uc;t = Et
"
uc;t+1
1 + '
 
1  ct+1 + clt+1

1 + '
 
1  ct + clt
 1 +A  st+1Fk;t+1   
#
+
+Et
"
A
 
st+1

Flk;t+1
1 + '
 
1  ct + clt
 t+1   Et+1t+2
#
; t  0, 8 st; (18)
where the variables are a function of the state, and ct =
ucc;t
uc;t
ct is the inverse of the in-
tertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption, lt =
ull;t
ul;t
lt denotes the inverse of
the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in labor, clt =
ucl;t
uc;t
lt stands for the elasticity of
the marginal utility of consumption with respect to labor, and lct =
ulc;t
ul;t
ct represents the
elasticity of the marginal disutility of labor with respect to consumption.
For the analysis that follows, one needs to nd the appropriate competitive equilibrium
conditions that are comparable with conditions (17) and (18) above. With that purpose,
we put conditions (6) and (10) together in order to obtain
 ul;t
 
st

uc;t (st)
=
1   lt
 
st

1 +  ct (s
t)
A
 
st

Fl;t
 
st

; (19)
where conditions (19) are written with equality instead of the mathematically implied in-
equality, since the planner is going to set  lt so that the equality holds, as discussed through-
out the proof of Lemma (1). The reason is that whenever conditions (19) are not veried
with equality, the planner can increase  lt, thus relaxing the budget constraint of the govern-
ment (11), without introducing any additional distortion, for in such a case, labor income
taxes are lump sum. Also, putting conditions (7) and (9) together yields
uc;t
 
st

= Et
"
uc;t+1
 
st+1
 h
1 +

1  kt+1
 
st

A
 
st+1

Fk;t+1
 
st+1
  i 1 +  ct  st
1 +  ct+1 (s
t+1)
#
:
(20)
The negative externality generated by the downward real wage rigidity assumption (1)
15
is observable once conditions (17) and (19) are confronted, as well as conditions (18) and
(20). Indeed, when deciding on their own, agents do not incorporate the fact that the
gross growth rate of return of wages cannot exceed  in their decisions, i.e. the current
real wage might inuence the future one, even though they are aware of that fact. As a
result, the economy may experience involuntary unemployment, as well as excessively high
or excessively small levels of capital. It depends on the values t
 
st

, t+1
 
st+1

, and
t+2
 
st+2

.
Although the present conditions provide all the information that is necessary to take
conclusions, one can, nonetheless, work on them in order to obtain the optimal wedges, thus
allowing for a more clear interpretation of the results.
Regarding the optimal state contingent labor wedge, we derive the following proposition:
Proposition 1 In this closed economy, the optimal state contingent labor wedge is
1   lt
 
st

1 +  ct (s
t)
=
1 + '
 
1  ct
 
st

+ clt
 
st

1 + '
 
1 + lt (s
t) + lct (s
t)
 +Fll;t  st
Fl;t (st)
t
 
st
  Ett+1  st+1
uc;t (st)

1 + '
 
1 + lt (s
t) + lct (s
t)
 :
(21)
Proof. The proof of Proposition (1) is straightforward. Indeed, we can use conditions (17)
and (19) to write the optimal labor wedge as presented in conditions (21).
It follows from Proposition (1) that the optimal labor income tax (a) increases with the
current lower bound on real wages and (b) decreases with the expectation of a future wage
constraint, for the marginal productivity of labor is assumed to be decreasing in the level of
labor (Fll < 0). We refer to the optimal labor income tax for a given consumption tax, since
the consumption tax is indeterminate. The intuition is presented for each case separately.
For (a), notice that whenever the wage constraint is binding in a given state of the current
period (t
 
st

> 0, where the value of t is higher the higher the current lower bound on
the real wage, wt 1
 
st 1

, is), which can, for instance, be due to a negative productivity
shock, there is involuntary unemployment, as the real wage cannot fully adjust, i.e. the real
wage consistent with exible wages is below the current lower bound. Consequently, taxing
labor income is equivalent to lump sum taxation, for the level of employment is completely
determined by the short side of the market, i.e. labor demand. The central planner is,
therefore, going to increase  lt
 
st

to reduce labor supply up to the point where the labor
market clears with wt = wt 1. As a result, the central planner is able to reduce  lt
 
st

in
other states of nature. Regarding hypothesis (b), the intuition is that whenever expectations
in the current period regarding the period that follows are such that the wage constraint
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may be binding
 
Ett+1
 
st+1

> 0

, which might be associated to the expectations of a
future negative productivity shock, the central planner should decrease  lt
 
st

in that state,
for in doing so the current real wage exclusive of taxes, i.e. the lower bound of the following
period, decreases through an increase of labor supply, hence loosening future constraints.
These lower revenues in this particular state of nature have to be compensated with higher
revenues in other states. In short, labor income taxation policy has two distinguishable
purposes. First, in (a) it assumes a reactive role, since it is just reacting to the current
ine¢ ciency in the labor market. And in (b), it assumes a precautionary role, for it is used
in the current period to prevent the negative impacts of an expected future ine¢ ciency.
If we take the second best optimal labor wedge as a reference (t = 0, for all t  0 and
st 2 St), we can conclude that the optimal state contingent labor income tax is higher in the
economy with wage rigidities whenever the wage constraint is binding
 
t
 
st

> 0

. The
reason follows directly from the intuition presented above. Whenever the wage constraint is
binding, the level of labor is demand determined, thus implying that  lt
 
st

is a lump sum
tax. Consequently, the central planner chooses to set a labor income tax above the second
best level. For expectations of future wage constraints
 
Ett+1
 
st+1

> 0

, the central
planner chooses levels for the labor income tax below the second best solution, as doing so
reduces the current real wage, thus relaxing future constraints.
Before the considerations on the optimal capital income tax, we introduce the following
assumption:
Assumption 1 Consumption taxes are chosen in such a way that
1 +  ct
 
st

1 +  ct+1 (s
t+1)
=
1 + '
 
1  ct+1
 
st+1

+ clt+1
 
st+1

1 + '
 
1  ct (st) + clt (st)
 .
Assumption (1) is justied by the fact that the optimal consumption taxes are inde-
terminate, for, as Lemma (1) suggests, these are irrelevant for the equilibrium allocations.
Consequently, one can use consumption taxes to allow for a broader family of instantaneous
utility functions that are consistent with a zero non state contingent capital income tax in
a second best environment. Without consumption taxes this argument could not be made,
unless the instantaneous utility function was assumed to exhibit separability in consump-
tion and labor, as well as a constant coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion in consumption 
clt = 0 and 
c
t = 
c
t+1, for all t  0 and st 2 St

.
Let us now move on to the optimal capital income tax, for which the following proposition
arises:
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
the next period is lower in any state of nature, thus contributing towards the reduction of
that periods real wage, i.e. the lower bound for two periods from the current one.
This concludes the closed economy section. In the section that follows, we open the
economy by introducing a foreign sector. In that open economy, we will ask the same
questions, i.e., the implications for optimal scal policy that stem from the downward wage
rigidity assumption.
3 The stochastic representative agent small open economy
with downward nominal wage rigidity and xed exchange
rates
In this section, we study a stochastic neoclassical growth model for the open version of
the economy studied in section 2. In particular, the set up is exactly the same as that
described in the previous section, but for a one sector small open economy, which allows
us to abstract from the strategic interactions that may arise when di¤erent territories are
able to implement their specic tax policies. There, the additional agent that needs to be
introduced is a foreign sector, with which the domestic economy trades consumption goods
and non state contingent debt denominated in foreign currency. We assume the tradeable
good produced domestically is identical in everything to the good produced abroad, i.e.
the representative household draws the same marginal utility out of the domestic and the
foreign goods. The implication is that the representative household buys the consumption
good wherever it nds it cheaper. As a result, the law of one price, which states that the a
good must cost the same independently of the placed from which it is purchased, provided
that cost is measured in the same currency, must hold, i.e.
Pt
 
st

= "t
 
st

P t ; t  0;8 st: (23)
We further assume that physical capital is produced domestically, and that labor is immo-
bile.
The small open economy takes stochastic international nominal interest rates it
 
st 1

,
the nominal exchange rates "t
 
st

, and international prices P t as given.4, where it
 
st 1

4The way to think about this assumption is as follows: by pegging to a certain currency, the small open
economy loses all control over the exchange rate with all the other currencies. For instance, after joining the
euro, Portugal lost control over the exchange rate between the escudo and the U.S. dollar.
Additionally, the process for the international price is not that relevant, for we are considering stochastic
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is the international nominal interest rate set in period t   1 and due in period t. The
economy is a nominal economy, for money is used as mean of value, though cashless, in
the sense that money is not needed for transactions5. Consequently, there are only markets
for goods, labor, capital, state contingent real government bonds, and non state contingent
foreign debt.
With these assumptions, together with an additional instrument, which we loosely de-
nominate a capital control tax, within a worldwide system of taxation, it is possible to show
that optimal taxation in the small open economy is quite similar to optimal taxation in a
closed economy, as demonstrated by Correia (1996).
Aside from the fact that the small open economy has no control over the nominal
exchange rate, we further impose that nominal wages are downwardly rigid à la Schmitt-
Grohé and Uribe (2016), i.e.
Wt
 
st
  Wt 1  st 1 ; (24)
where  2 ]0; 1] has the same meaning as in conditions (1), though now it stands for the
gross growth rate of nominal wages.
It is no longer necessary to assume downward real wage rigidity (1), for using the law of
one price (23) and dening the real wage as wt  WtPt , one can manipulate conditions (24)
to obtain a real wage rigidity in small open economy, i.e.
wt
 
st

= wt 1
 
st 1
 "t 1  st 1
"t (st)
P t 1
P t
;
where it is clear that without control over the nominal exchange rate or without exible
nominal wages, there might exist periods of involuntary unemployment. Nevertheless, if at
least one of these variables is exible, there will be no real wage rigidities, thus implying
the second best solution is attainable.
nominal exchange rates. The domestic price responds in the same way to a nominal appreciation or a lower
international price. All in all, what matters is that the international price measured in domestic currency is
stochastic.
5This can be thought of as the limit case of a cash-in-advance economy, in which the transaction technology
is
Ptct  vMt;
where the velocity tends to innite, v !1.
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
together with a no Ponzi games condition, where TB represents the trade balance of the
domestic small open economy. We cannot individually distinguish exports from imports,
for there is only one single good in the model.
3.5 Market clearing conditions
The presence of downward nominal wage rigidity combined with the absence of control over
the nominal exchange rate determines the possible existence of states of nature where the
market clearing real wage is below its implied lower bound, i.e. there may exist involuntary
unemployment. Such a situation is to arise whenever condition (24) for a certain state is
binding, thus implying the level of employment is demand determined. As a result, condition
(6) is veried with inequality in that state. The opposite could also be said. If the market
clearing real wage is consistent exible wages (condition (6) holds with equality), that is
a consequence of having the nominal wage fully adjusting to the current circumstances
(condition (24) does not bind). All in all, the complementary slackness condition (12)
needs to be updated to the open economy version. Specically, it needs to be consistent
with the assumption of downwardly rigid nominal wages, which implies 
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In the closed economy of section 2, if wage rigidity was nominal, as in conditions (24),
conditions (30) would not exist, for it would be possible to use the price level to overcome
the nominal wage rigidity. To illustrate this point, recall that wt  WtPt and rewrite the
rms optimal marginal conditions for labor (10) as
Pt
 
st

=
Wt
 
st

At (st)Fl;t (st)
:
It becomes clear that if prices are exible, they can be used to overcome the nominal
wage rigidity. The problem, however, is that in this small open economy environment, the
domestic price level is, in equilibrium, determined outside the economy according to the law
of one price (23), thus invalidating the use of this variable to overcome the wage rigidity
when nominal exchange rates are taken as given.
Since the variable representing net foreign debt stands for both its demand and supply,
the other necessary market clearing conditions are those concerning the goods market. This
condition needs to incorporate the fact that, now, the domestic economy can trade goods
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with the foreign sector. That being said, the goods market clearing conditions for each state
of nature st in each period t  0 are
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3.6 Competitive equilibrium
Denition 2 In this stochastic small open economy, a competitive equilibrium is a set
of allocations
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for all st 2 St, such that given the exogenous
stochastic government expenditures g
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, productivity A
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, nominal exchange rates "t
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,
international nominal interest rates it
 
st 1

; the international price P t , the initial stock of
capital k0, government bonds b0, external debt D0, and the historical nominal wageW 1, the
following conditions are met: (i) the representative household maximizes lifetime expected
utility subject to the budget constraints and taking prices, taxes, international nominal in-
terest rates, and nominal exchange rates as given; (ii) rms maximize state by state prots
subject to their technological constraints and taking prices as given; (iii) the government sat-
ises its budget constraints; (iv) the budget constraints with the foreign sector are satised;
and (v) markets clear.
Based on Denition (2), the competitive equilibrium in this economy is characterized
by conditions (25), (6)-(8), (27), (9), (10), (29), (30), (31), and (23), together with the
terminal conditions (4), (5), and (26), with k0, b0, D0, and W 1 given. Once again, the
budget constraints of the government (28) are a linear combination of the other equilibrium
conditions, i.e. they are met by Walraslaw.
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
equilibrium allocations.
In other words, we have to show that a given arbitrary set of allocations

ct
 
st

;
lt
 
st

; kt+1
 
st
	1
t=0
and net foreign debt

Dt+1
 
st
	1
t=0
verifying (32) with equality, (33),
and (34) meets the competitive equilibrium conditions (25), (6)-(8), (27), (9), (10), (29),
(30), (31), and (23).
The households budget constraints (25) are met, for the implementability condition
is an alternative representation of those conditions. Furthermore, the completeness of the
assets market guarantees that the implementability condition implies that the state by
state budget constraints are met, for there are as many instruments as there are states
of nature. Hence, we need only to choose bt+1
 
st+1

in every state. The intratemporal
marginal conditions (6) determine the state contingent labor income tax  lt
 
st

for all the
states, while the intertemporal marginal conditions (7), (8), and (27) are satised with
the appropriate choice of the non state contingent capital income tax kt+1
 
st

, the price
of state contingent real government bonds qt
 
st+1

, and the non state contingent capital
control tax Dt+1
 
st

, respectively. The rms conditions (9) and (10) are recovered choosing
the return on capital rkt
 
st

and the nominal wageWt
 
st

in every state, and the law of one
price (23) pins down Pt
 
st

. Finally, the law of motion of net foreign debt (29) determines
the trade balance TBt
 
st

. The complementary slackness conditions (30) are satised, for
the central planner is always going to conduct policy in such a way that condition (6) is
veried with equality, which, in turn, implies that the implementability condition (14) holds
with equality. Finally, the resource constraints (31) are satised by denition of the given
allocation.
Once again, it can be concluded that the state contingent consumption tax is an irrel-
evant instrument in this economy, for it is possible to attain any allocation with any path
for  ct
 
st

.
3.7.2 Optimal taxes
As in section 2, we follow a Ramsey approach in order to determine the optimal tax policy in
this stochastic small open economy. There, we have imposed Assumption (1). This feature
also applies for the present section.
In consideration of the foregoing, we follow Lucas and Stokey (1983) and dene the
social planners problem as the choice of

ct
 
st

; lt
 
st

; kt+1
 
st

; Dt+1
 
st
	1
t=0
8 st 2 St
that maximizes lifetime expected utility (2) subject to the implementability condition (32)
with equality, the resource constraints (33), and the nominal wage constraints (34), with
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> 0 implies that condition (34) binds. Hence, we need the following condition:
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In conclusion, the conditions which, together with the implementability condition (32)
with equality, the resource constraints (33), the complementary slackness conditions (35),
and with k0, b0, D0, andW 1 given, characterize the solution to the social planners problem
are
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where the variables are a function of the state and ct , 
l
t, 
cl
t , and 
lc
t are dened as before.
The competitive equilibrium conditions (19) and (20) still apply in this small open econ-
omy and from them, respectively, it is possible to determine the optimal state contingent
labor tax and the non state contingent capital income tax. Nonetheless, in order to deter-
mine the optimal non state contingent capital control tax, we need rst to use conditions
(27), which together with the law of one price (23) become
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



















 

interesting is that we were able to replicate this result, which is a generalization of Judds
(1985) and Chamleys (1986) result of zero capital income taxation in the steady state of a
deterministic closed economy, in a stochastic small open economy.
4 Extension : a special consumption tax
In section 3 we have argued that the real wage rigidity arises due to the combination of
downwardly rigid nominal wages and exogenous nominal exchange rates. Consequently, if
nominal wages were fully exible ( = 0 in conditions (24)) or if nominal exchange rates
were exible, the real wage rigidity would not exist, thus implying that the second best
solution would be attainable.
In this section, in contrast with Adão, Correia, and Teles (2010) payroll taxes that
implement the competitive equilibrium allocations with stable nominal wages and a constant
nominal exchange rate, hence eliminating the costs of xed exchange rate regimes9, we use
consumption taxes to eliminate these costs. With this instrument, we can discriminate
between the good produced domestically and the good produced abroad in such a way
that the costs of a combination of downward nominal wage rigidity and exogenous nominal
exchange rates are eliminated, i.e. the second best solution can be implemented. The
assumption follows:.
Assumption 2 The incidence of the consumption tax falls only on the nal good produced
domestically.
The motivation for this scal regime is associated with the irrelevance of consumption
taxes for the allocations, i.e. the fact that consumption taxes are a free variable in the small
open economy of section 3, as suggested by Lemma (2).
It follows from Assumption (2) that the relevant price for the domestic good is the
price charged by domestic rms gross of consumption taxes, whereas the relevant price for
the international good is the international price. As a result, the law of one price for this
economy must change accordingly. It becomes
 
1 +  ct
 
st

Pt
 
st

= "t
 
st

P t ; t  0;8 st: (43)
Given that P t is exogenous to the small open economy, it can be thought of as including
9However, the necessary decrease in payroll taxes should be accompanied by higher labor income taxes,
which might be hard to implement since it represents a transfer of wealth from households to capitalists.
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both the case in which the domestic household has to pay consumption taxes abroad for
the imported good and the case in which it does not.
The suitability of this assumption relates to the idea that consumption taxes can be
used to replicate a nominal devaluation, as the real wage in the small open economy can
now be written as
wt
 
st
  Wt  st
Pt (st)
=
 
1 +  ct
 
st

Wt
 
st

"t (st)P t
: (44)
From conditions (44), it is possible to conclude that subsidizing exports, or, alternatively,
taxing imports, by means of lowering the consumption tax rate works in the same way as
a nominal devaluation. The basic intuition is that both these policies contribute to an
increase in the relative price of imported goods, exclusive of consumption taxes. We have,
thus, gained the freedom to control real wages in the domestic economy in an environment of
exogenous exchange rates and downward nominal wage rigidities, for the exogenous nominal
exchange rate and international price pin down the domestic price gross of consumption
taxes, but not each individual component ( ct and Pt).
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4.1 Implications for the allocations
Since consumption taxes can be used to replace the role of exible nominal exchange rates,
then, whenever the wage constraint is binding, decreasing the consumption tax rate, i.e.
subsidizing exports or taxing imports, allows the real wage to adjust to its level consistent
with exible wages, for the price of the domestic good exclusive of taxes has to increase
to meet the law of one price (43). This, in turn, means that the second best solution
can be implemented, i.e. the set of attainable allocations is fully characterized by the
implementability condition (32) with equality and the resource constraints (33), even though
nominal wages are downwardly rigid and nominal exchange rates taken as given.
The proposition follows:
Proposition 5 Let the nominal wage be downwardly rigid, as in conditions (24), and the
nominal exchange rates be exogenous. Then, the second best solution can still be imple-
mented in this small open economy provided Assumption (2) is met.
Proof. To prove Proposition (5), one has to show that the set of attainable allocations
is fully characterized by the implementability condition (32) with equality and the re-
10A limitation that could be presented to this solution is the possible necessity of setting  ct <  1, as that
would imply that the consumer was being paid to consume. However, from the nonnegativity of the real
wage,  ct   1 is guaranteed.
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source constraints (33), even with a combination of downward nominal wage rigidity and
exogenous nominal exchange rates. Hence, consider a given arbitrary set of allocations
ct
 
st

; lt
 
st

; kt+1
 
st
	1
t=0
and net foreign debt

Dt+1
 
st
	1
t=0
for all st 2 St verifying
(32) with equality and (33).
The households budget constraints (25) are met, for the implementability condition
is an alternative representation of those conditions. Furthermore, the completeness of the
assets market guarantees that the implementability condition implies that the state by
state budget constraints are met, for there are as many instruments as there are states
of nature. Hence, we need only to choose bt+1
 
st+1

in every state. The intratemporal
marginal conditions (6) determine the state contingent labor income tax  lt
 
st

, while the
intertemporal marginal conditions (7), (8), and (27) are satised choosing, respectively,
the non state contingent capital income tax kt+1
 
st

, the price of state contingent real
government bonds qt
 
st+1

, and the non state contingent capital control tax Dt+1
 
st

. The
rms optimal conditions (9) and (10) can be recovered with the appropriate choice of the
capital rent rkt
 
st

and the price of the domestic good Pt
 
st

. The budget constraints with
the foreign sector (29) determine the trade balance TBt
 
st

. And the law of one price (43)
determines the consumption tax  ct
 
st

. The resource constraints (31) are met by denition
of the sequence of allocations.
It is indeed the case that the second best solution is achievable, as consumption taxes,
when used in the right way, replace a nominal devaluation of the domestic currency, thus
allowing the economy to have no involuntary unemployment in every state of nature. Conse-
quently, the downward nominal wage rigidity assumption (24) is irrelevant, i.e. t
 
st

= 0,
t  0 8 st, even in the presence of exogenous nominal exchange rates11.
Moreover, Proposition (5) can be extended to other constraints on nominal wages, as
argued in Adão, Correia, and Teles (2009) for the case of price rigidities and Adão, Correia,
and Teles (2010) for the case of wage rigidities. The proof of Proposition (5) justies this
extrapolation. Notice that the implementation of the second best allocations did not require
the use of the nominal wage to meet any competitive equilibrium condition, which means
that Wt
 
st

is a free variable. Ergo, whatever nominal wage rigidity exists, it will not be
relevant.
11Albeit interesting from a theoretical point of view, this result is also hard to implement, for it stems
from subsidizing exports and taxing imports. This is, however, one of the usual policies recommended to
substitute exchange rate policy (see Farhi, Gopinath, and Itskhoki, 2012), although it goes against free trade.
On top of that, our result is only possible since the price level Pt is assumed to be exible.
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 
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



 

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
is reached. This does not mean that the central planner is distorting intertemporally. In
fact, in expected value terms, there is no intertemporal distortion.
5 Concluding remarks
Throughout this thesis, the implications on optimal scal policy arising from the considera-
tion of downward wage rigidities were studied. Starting with a closed economy environment,
where real wages were assumed to be downwardly rigid, we have shown that the benevo-
lent central planner, who chooses the sequence of optimal taxes according to a Ramsey
approach, is able to incorporate the existence of downwardly rigid wages (something that
individual agents do not do, though they are aware of that fact) through the use of labor
and capital income taxes. Indeed, it was proven that the optimal state contingent labor
income tax has a dual role. On the one hand, it is used as a reactive tool, since it behaves as
a labor supply shifter to make the excessively high real wage consistent with labor market
clearing (though at a level of employment below the second best solution). However, the
optimal labor income tax also exhibits properties of a precautionary tool, for, anticipating
a future negative shock, it can be used to establish a smaller lower bound on real wages in
the period that follows. Relative to the second best solution, the optimal labor income tax,
when used as a reactive tool, is higher, since it is a lump sum tax, whereas, when used as
a precautionary tool, it becomes lower than its second best counterpart, as there is a need
to reduce the current labor market clearing wage.
Once the closed economy was opened to a foreign sector, which was assumed to be taken
as given, and non state contingent foreign nominal bonds denominated in foreign currency
were introduced as another source of revenue for the domestic representative household, our
results have not changed. Indeed, the consideration of downward nominal wage rigidities,
combined with an exogenous stochastic sequence of nominal exchange rates, which created
a real wage rigidity, produced exactly the same results in terms of the optimal state con-
tingent labor income tax, i.e. it still exhibited both a reactive and a precautionary nature.
Additionally, and this is, perhaps, the most interesting part of our ndings for the small
open economy, there is a consumption tax policy such that the optimal non state contingent
capital control tax can be set to zero for a broad family of instantaneous utility functions,
thus contradicting Schmitt-Grohé and Uribes (2016) result regarding the optimality of a
capital control tax, prudential in nature.
David Humes intuition in Of Money and Of Interest that monetary policy shocks are
irrelevant for the allocations is shown to hold in the small open economy (though not in the
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conventional way), but only under the consideration of a tax system such that the incidence
of the consumption tax falls only on the nal good produced domestically. Indeed, the
central planner can discriminate between the domestic and the foreign goods by using the
state contingent consumption taxes to implement the second best solution, thus implying
that downward nominal wage rigidities, combined with exogenous nominal exchange rates,
are irrelevant for the allocations. Without this irrelevance result, the equilibrium wage rate
could move with a nominal appreciation shock, which is something that is not in accordance
with the quantity theory of money. Furthermore, this result is interesting, for it diverges
from the use of payroll taxes proposed in Adão, Correia, and Teles (2010), though the
proposed consumption tax policy is suitable only in this environment in which the nominal
price of the domestic good is exible, although determined according to the law of one price.
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